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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of nuclear energy in Scotland, and the concerns for 
Scotland as it votes for independence. The aim is to focus directly on current Scottish 
energy policy and its relationship to nuclear energy. The paper does not purport to 
advise on a vote for or against Scottish independence but aims to further the debate in 
an underexplored area of energy policy that will be of value whether Scotland secures 
independence or further devolution. There are four central parts to this paper: (1) 
consideration of the Scottish electricity mix; (2) an analysis of a statement about 
nuclear energy made by the Scottish energy minister; (3) examination of nuclear 
energy issues as presented in the Scottish Independence White Paper; and (4) the 
issue of nuclear waste is assessed. A recurrent theme in the analysis is that whether 
one is for, against, or indifferent to new nuclear energy development, it highlights a 
major gap in Scotland’s energy and environmental policy goals. Too often, the energy 
policy debate from the Scottish Government perspective has been reduced to a low- 
carbon energy development debate between nuclear energy and renewable energy. 
There is little reflection on how to reduce Scottish dependency on fossil fuels. For 
Scotland to aspire to being a low-carbon economy, to decarbonising its electricity 
market, and to being a leader within the climate change community, it needs to tackle 
the issue of how to stop the continuation of burning fossil fuels. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2010, UK government policy on energy provision reached a state of tension. One 
point of tension was that the parties comprising the new UK coalition government 
(the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats) had expressed different manifesto 
commitments on energy. Second, in Scotland and Wales, the devolved governments 
each expressed the importance of developing large-scale renewable projects in their 
jurisdiction. Indeed, Scotland had moved further down its own path than Wales and in 
2008 the Scottish Parliament produced its own energy policy document for Scotland 
that included an expressed opposition to new nuclear power stations.1 
 
As the vote on the 18 September 2014 for Scottish Independence looms, a debate on 
energy policy in Scotland is due and could play a crucial role in determining the 
outcome. Ever since the statement in 2008 in the earlier mentioned energy policy 
document where the Scottish Government said no to future nuclear new build in 
Scotland, it seems that debate on nuclear energy as part of the Scottish energy mix has 
ceased.2  However, herein lies a significant problem. Nuclear energy provides ca. a 
third of Scottish electricity supply. Replacing this will be a significant problem, and 
one that has not been addressed in any discussions yet. 
 
If Scotland were to choose to go down the route to independence in 2014 the process 
that would follow will take some time. Alex Salmond leader of the Scottish National 
Party is reported to be keen to declare Scottish Independence in March 2016 just 
before the next Scottish Parliamentary elections scheduled to occur in May of that 
year3. From that election process a new Scottish government will emerge. It is that 
government that would oversee the policies of a newly independent Scotland. It seems 
highly probable that the SNP would lead the first government of a newly independent 
Scotland and hence one might expect a continued ambitious plan for Scotland to be a 
low-carbon economy. Within that framework the SNP is generally averse to nuclear 
new build, but the full range of issues shaping the future role of nuclear energy has 
not been explored. As things stand today (early 2014) the debate has centred on 
promoting the development of more wind farms and the ownership of the oil and gas 
resources in the North Sea. The continued focus on the extraction of oil and gas in the 
North Sea cannot contribute to Scotland developing itself into a low-carbon nation. 
 
In a strict constitutional sense energy policy is not devolved from London to 
Edinburgh. The UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) formally has 
authority over policy in the whole of the UK, but the reality is that Scotland has much 
policy power in practice and the Scottish Government has an energy minister, Fergus 
Ewing. The strongest aspect of DECC policy power concerns electricity market 
arrangements  on  the island  of  Great  Britain 4 .  The  British  electricity  market  has 
included Scotland since April 2005 and the formation of the British   Electricity Trading  Transmission  Arrangements which essentially brought Scotland into the 
 
 
1 Scottish Government, 2008. Scottish Energy Policy: An Overview (2008). [Last accessed 08 January 
2014, available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/237670/0065265.pdf ]. 
2 Fn.1, Ibid. 
3 BBC News Website, 2013. Q&A: Scottish independence referendum. [Last accessed 27 February 
2014, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-13326310 ]. 4 Northern Ireland is part of a single electricity market with the Republic of Ireland [see: last accessed 
27 February 2014 http://www.sem-o.com/Pages/default.aspx ]. 
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market arrangements established in England and Wales. The (UK) Energy Act 2013 
implements  Electricity  Market  Reform  (EMR)  and  further  adjusts  market 
arrangements especially relating to new build low-carbon generation. Despite the 
formal power of Westminster and Whitehall over Scottish energy policy, the reality, 
especially as relates to new infrastructure investment, is that the Scottish Government 
has power over all decision making relating to environmental permission and as such 
it has a veto over all proposed investments. That reality ensures that while EMR will 
apply in Scotland, its powerful arrangements intended to make possible new nuclear 
build will have no direct impact in Scotland. 
 
The current academic literature is somewhat divided on the issue of the effect of 
Scottish devolution on UK energy policy. The Scotland Act 1998 which created the 
new Scottish Parliament appears to have given Scotland extensive powers regarding 
the formulation of its own environmental policy (Little, 2000) 5. However, as Little 
(2000)  determined,  there  are  limiting  factors  such  as  the  need  to  adhere  to 
international and EU environmental law as well as the provisions for judicial review 
and political review by the UK Government. In this context, Keating (2010)6 argued 
that while Scottish devolution may be limited by intergovernmental relations with 
both the UK and the EU in many policy areas, there are nevertheless opportunities for 
policy innovation. Hence, while developing its own environmental policy maybe a 
limited exercise, Scotland has in effect the capability to pursue its own energy policy. 
It remains to be seen how far Scotland may diverge in its approach to its energy 
policy from that of the residual UK, and as of yet the only distinctive difference with 
the rest of the UK has been the decision not to build new nuclear reactors. It is 
arguable therefore that energy policy has fragmented to a degree within the UK and 
though this is a topic to consider in more depth in future, it can be stated that the 
Scottish move in 2008 to have its own energy policy has added to the uncertainty in 
the development of a long-term UK energy policy. 
 
This paper examines the role of nuclear energy in Scotland, and the resulting concerns 
for Scotland as it votes for independence. The aim is not to provide an overview of 
the UK nuclear energy industry7 nor engage in a discussion about a possible nuclear 
renaissance 8     but  to  focus  directly  on  current  Scottish  energy  policy  and  its 
relationship to nuclear energy. There are four central parts to this paper: (1) the 
Scottish  electricity mix  is  detailed;  (2)  a  statement  about  nuclear  energy  by the 
Scottish energy minister is analysed; (3) nuclear energy as stated within the Scottish 
Independence  White  Paper  is  examined 9 ;  and  (4)  the  issue  of  nuclear  waste  is 
assessed. The paper does not purport to advise on a vote for or against Scottish 
 
 
 
5 Little, G. 2000. Scottish Devolution and Environmental Law. Journal of Environmental Law, 12 (2) 
55-174. 
6 Keating, M. 2010. (2nd  Ed.). The Government of Scotland: Public Policy Making After Devolution. 
EUP: Edinburgh, UK. 
7 Please see the following for analysis of history of the UK nuclear energy sector: Taylor, S. 2007. 
Privatization and financial collapse in the nuclear industry – the origins and cause of the British Energy 
crisis of 2002. Routledge: London, UK. 
8 Please see the following for more detail on the nuclear renaissance: Nuttall, W. J. 2005. Nuclear 
Renaissance: Technologies and Policies for the Future of Nuclear Power. Taylor and Francis: Oxon, 
UK. 
9  Scottish  Government. (2013).  Scotland’s Future: Your  Guide  to  an  Independent Scotland. The 
Scottish Government: St. Andrew’s House, Edinburgh, UK. 
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independence but aims to further the debate in an underexplored area of energy policy 
that will be of value whether Scotland secures independence or further devolution. 
 
In this paper we also do not explore the interesting and contentious issues relating to 
nuclear  weapons  policy  and  an  independent  Scotland.  The  United  Kingdom 
submarine-based nuclear deterrent is based at Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde at 
Faslane with supporting infrastructures, such as the Royal Naval Armaments Depot 
Coulport nearby. In the event that Scotland were to become independent of the United 
Kingdom a key infrastructure of the UK nuclear deterrent would be outside the UK. 
In October 2012 Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond spoke out against any 
connection between an independent Scotland and support for UK nuclear weapons. 
He is reported to have said: “The UK government has two choices – they either 
relocate Trident to another part of the rest of the UK or alternatively they could use 
nuclear facilities in America or France.”10 
 
The civil nuclear power debate has parallels with the defence nuclear debate in 
discussions  of  Scottish  independence.  There  are  also  the  possibilities  of  some 
linkages, such as that a slow erosion of Scottish civil nuclear expertise could have 
implications for the governance and even maintenance of the nuclear defence 
capabilities on Scottish territory. Notwithstanding such synergies this paper will focus 
entirely on civil energy policy issues. 
 
2. The Scottish Electricity Mix 
 
In 2008 Scottish National Party (SNP) Leader and First Minister Alex Salmond 
asserted that Scotland had achieved electricity self-sufficiency even without the 
substantial nuclear power generation in the country11. It would appear however that 
he was relying on annual averaging of just a number of years to justify his claim and 
periods of renewable power surplus (and export) were being allowed to offset periods 
of shortfall. At that time, on average, 20 per cent of Scottish power was exported to 
England. In terms of the electricity market structure, despite potentially no currency 
union there would not be a significant impact in terms of investment or market 
withdrawal by energy companies.12 
 
Data from 2002-2012 for the Scottish Electricity Mix is stated in Figure 1. Notable is 
the reliance on fossil fuels that are 48.7 per cent of the total electricity generation. 
 
 
10 BBC, 2012. Nuclear weapons 'outlawed' in an independent Scotland, says Salmond 
[Last accessed 18 April 2014, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics- 
20020839 ]. 
11  The Scotsman, Salmond: nuclear redundant in self-sufficient Scotland, 10 January 2008. [Last 
accessed 27 February 2014, available at:  http://www.scotsman.com/news/salmond-nuclear-redundant- 
in-self-sufficient-scotland-1-1073316 ]. 
12 This is because expectation would be for minimal change due to EU policy being for further 
integration of electricity markets. In this context Scotland could sell electricity to other markets just as 
the rest of the UK could buy electricity from other markets. Therefore keeping a common electricity 
market would be reasonable for both sides despite no currency union. For more on this see: UK 
Parliament Energy and Climate Change Committee, June 2012. [Last accessed 29 March 2014, 
available at: 
[http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmenergy/writev/scottish/m01.htm ]. 
This includes data on current investments by a number of energy companies and their investment 
indicates that the prospect of the break-up of the UK currency union post Scottish Independence is not 
such an issue for energy investment. 
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There is also a heavy reliance on nuclear energy, which provides 30.6 per cent13; a 
high proportion considering that Scotland has a ‘no to new nuclear energy’ policy. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Scottish Electricity Generation Mix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Energy in Scotland: A Compendium of Scottish Energy Statistics and Information (2012).14 
 
Scottish energy policy faces a challenge seen elsewhere in Europe (e.g. Germany). 
The stated goal of policy is to move towards a low-carbon economy. Alongside that 
ambition is a policy aversion to nuclear power - the policy of ‘no to new nuclear 
energy’. In this constrained way Scotland is aiming to change 79.3 per cent15  of its 
electricity generation. It is the Scottish Energy Policy of 2008 that dictated that all 
efforts would be made to embark on a path towards a carbon-free Scotland.16  More 
recently, this ‘carbon-free Scotland’ is also supported by the new Scotland 2020 
Climate Group17 and the new 2020 Routemap for Renewable Energy in Scotland.18 
 
With the expected closure of the nuclear reactors and the replacement of fossil fuel 
energy sources in the push for a low-carbon economy, it is clear that new energy 
infrastructure  is  needed;  and  therefore  the  earlier  mentioned  79.3  per  cent  of 
Scotland’s electricity generation (kWh supplied) will have to be replaced. Factoring 
in the abundance of wind farms already in place and planned, it remains to be seen 
 
 13 Based on 2010 data. 
14 The Scottish Government. 2012. Energy in Scotland: A Compendium of Scottish Energy Statistics 
and Information. [Last accessed 08 January 2014, available at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0038/00389297.pdf and also the Energy Statistics available 
at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Business/TrendData ]. 
15 This comprises of the 48.7 per cent of the total electricity generation by fossil fuels and the 30.6 per 
cent from nuclear energy. 
16 Scottish Energy Policy of 2008, See FN. 1. 
17 For more on the Scotland 2020 Climate Group, see the link: [Last accessed 08 January 2014, 
available at http://www.2020climategroup.org.uk/]. 
18 See the 2020 Routemap For Renewable Energy In Scotland: [Last accessed 08 January 2014, 
available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0044/00441628.pdf]. 
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what form this new technology will take. With nuclear energy not an option, one idea 
mooted is to fit future (or even existing) gas and coal plants with Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS) technology. However, whether Scottish CCS is viable and sufficient 
(noting  residual  emissions  and  thermodynamic  efficiency  penalties)  to  meet  the 
targets of Scotland’s low-carbon policy is still to be demonstrated. In this context, a 
transitional approach of switching to gas first and then to other lower-carbon sources 
may be adopted. Scotland could see therefore see a ‘dash for gas’ however, will new 
gas energy infrastructure have to be fitted with CCS technology or even be capture- 
ready’? 
 
One of the main reasons for the Scottish ‘no to new nuclear energy’ is its failure to 
have a solution for its long-term waste. However, CCS technology has some similar 
waste issues to nuclear power.19  Further, it is not presently commercially viable nor 
does it actually reduce the carbon emissions on a gas or coal power plant to zero. For 
example, gas produces just less than 400 kilograms per megawatt hour (kg/MWh) of 
CO2  and through the use of CCS technology these emissions will be reduced by ca. 
85 percent – however, it will increase the cost of the of construction up to 60 per cent 
and reduce the efficiency of the power station. 20  Moves to fit CCS technology to 
Longannet power station in Fife, Scotland, stalled and were eventually scrapped in 
2011.21  Given these realities, and with an abundance of hydroelectric power plants 
(150  schemes  currently)  already in  place,  it  remains  for  other  renewable  energy 
sources to help fill the looming supply gap in Scottish electricity supply. The strong 
presence of despatchable hydro-power in Scotland favours high levels of penetration 
by intermittent renewables especially if there is a reduced obligation to address issues 
of grid instability in England. 
 
The crux of the problem is the replacement issue of old energy infrastructure. There 
are challenges between the old and new energy infrastructure in Scotland. The legacy 
of environmental impact is not considered in sufficient detail when planning for new 
energy infrastructure. Simply, because one technology choice is cheaper than another 
does not mean it actually is when viewed over its lifetime. Nuclear power stations 
have the longest lifespan (up to 60 years), while gas and coal plants have a shorter 
lifespan (up to 40 years) and wind turbines having in many cases just a 25-year life 
span. 
 
There are also fuel and waste costs. In particular, the costs for waste (radioactive 
waste and carbon dioxide emissions) across the energy sector are an unresolved issue. 
The cost of waste for long-term storage for nuclear energy or CCS are difficult to 
quantify while carbon emissions from coal, gas and oil fired plants continue unabated 
and untaxed across the world. Wind projects suffer from reliability problems along 
with the interfering with wildlife and scenery.  It  is clear that whatever policy a 
 
 
 
 
19 Reiner, D. M. and Nuttall, W. J. Geological Disposal of Carbon Dioxide and Radioactive Waste: 
Similarities and Differences, in Toth, F. L. 2011. (Editor) Geological Disposal of Carbon Dioxide and 
Radioactive Waste: A Comparative Assessment, Springer: New York. 
20 International Energy Agency, 2013. Technology Roadmap: Carbon capture and storage. OECD/IEA: 
Paris, France. 
21 BBC. 2011. Longannet carbon capture scheme scrapped. [Last accessed 08 January 2014, available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-15371258]. 
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government follows regarding energy infrastructure there will be both positives and 
negatives. 
 
Due  to  the  financial  climate  across  the  world,  it  seems  more  sensible  to  make 
decisions that can have a short to medium term impact. A low-carbon economy is 
highly desirable, and a government also needs to ensure the development of energy 
infrastructure that will not leave or create harmful environmental legacies for the next 
generation. However, at the same time it needs to ensure that a low-carbon Scotland 
does not come at too high a price for its current population. A transitional approach 
that may involve a Scottish ‘dash for gas’ might be one such strategy to achieve this. 
Overall,  more  modest  goals  that  place  climate  change  at  the  forefront  of  the 
triumvirate of policies - economic, environmental and energy - and decision-making 
will make for a more sustainable low-carbon economy in the long run. 
 
 
 
3. Nuclear Energy in Scotland 
 
Scotland has been home to nuclear power plants since their introduction in the UK 
and there have always been issues with their location. 22   Currently, there are two 
nuclear power plants with two reactors each in operation in Scotland – see Table 1 
below. Nuclear power plants face significant environmental challenges when 
decommissioned. A need exists however to maintain and develop new expertise in 
this area with the final four operational reactors in Scotland due to be closed by 2023 
though Hunterston B was originally scheduled for closure in 2016. 
 
Table 1: Nuclear Energy Plants in Scotland, UK. 
 
Name Capacity Technology Began Scheduled for Status 
Operation Closure 
Hunterston B 
 
Hunterston A 
Torness 
 
Chapelcross 
Dounreay 
960 MW AGR 1976 2023 
(current) 
2 x 160MW Magnox 1964 Closed - 1989 
1185MW AGR 1988 2023 
(current) 
4 x 49 MWe Magnox 1959 Closed - 2004 
Research DMTR, 1955 Closed 1994 
Reactors DFR, PFR 
Source: Compiled by Authors and EDF (2013).23 
 
A nuclear power plant generally can take four to six years to build but it can also take 
the same amount of time to actually begin the construction on the project. Reactor 
design approval, project finance, and planning permission all take years to prepare 
and obtain. While the UK is in the process of making and ensuring significant gains in 
these areas, a nuclear new build project is still one with a long-term planning and 
development phase. Hence, a government decision on developing nuclear new build 
should be taken sooner rather than later. One important consideration in this context 
will be life extensions. Life extensions are extremely cost-efficient investments for 
 
 
22 The siting of UK nuclear installations has recently been reviewed by Grimston et al. (2014), see: 
Grimston, M., Nuttall, W.J. and Vaughan, G. 2014. The siting of UK nuclear reactors. Journal of 
Radioological Protection, 34 (2), R1-R24. 
23 EDF. 2013. EDF Energy's nuclear power stations. [Last accessed 08 January 2014, available at 
http://www.edfenergy.com/energyfuture/edf-energys-approach-why-we-choose-new-nuclear/current- 
nuclear-sites]. 
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the  operating  company.  The  economic  attractiveness  of  a  nuclear  reactor  life 
extension  far  exceeds  that  of  new  power  station  construction  of  any  type  and 
especially nuclear new build. 
 
The energy company, EDF, now owns and operates the nuclear power plants in 
Scotland. Recently, they began to push for an extension of the operating lifespan of 
the nuclear reactors in Scotland. The Scottish government has publicly stated that they 
will  not  object  to  these  potential  life  extension  requests. 24    In  December  2012, 
Hunsterson  B received  a life extension until 2023. 25   In  addition, the AGR twin 
reactors at Torness (the other nuclear power plant location in Scotland) are among the 
most modern of the UK fleet of AGR plants. The presumption is that EDF will follow 
a strategy beyond 2023 of securing life extensions of seven years duration.26 EDF is 
currently developing this programme of securing life extensions for these aging plants 
from beyond 2023, however, it may only be able to secure one to two more life 
extensions. Therfore, based on seven-year life extension, 2030 or 2037 may see both 
nuclear power plant closures in Scotland and a need for this energy supply to be 
replaced. Hence, the importance of the government decision on developing nuclear 
new build is highlighted again. 
 
The mutual importance between Scotland and the UK nuclear industry is revealed by 
the fact that, ca. 2013, the UK had roughly 63,000 people employed in the nuclear 
sector including the direct supply chain, of whom 8.3 per cent were based in 
Scotland.27  While the Scottish government is somewhat hostile to nuclear weapons, 
civil nuclear power and nuclear research these various capabilities represent an 
important part of the Scottish economy especially in some regions, such as the remote 
Caithness  coast  (Highlands  and  Islands  –  see  Table  2)  where  the  Dounreay 
laboratories are located. In Table 2 below, it is evident that the majority of the nuclear 
workforce are in relatively vulnerable employment regions and post independence 
this may put some of these jobs under threat especially when the ‘no new nuclear 
energy’ policy of the Scottish Government is factored in. 
 
Table 2: Nuclear Workforce by Scottish Region 2013 
Scottish Region 2013 Percentage 
Central Scotland 5.4% 
Glasgow 13.4% 
Highlands and Islands 27.5% 
Lothian 1.3% 
Mid Scotland and Fife 2.5% 
North East Scotland 0.1% 
South Scotland 24% 
West Scotland 25.7% 
 
 
 
24 BBC. 2012. Scotland’s nuclear stations could stay open. [Last accessed 08 January 2014, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-17266084]. 
25 BBC. 2012. Hunterston B nuclear power plant will run until 2023. [Last accessed 08 January 2014, 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-20590915]. 
26 EDF, 2012. Regulatory Story: Life Extensions. [Last accessed 18 April 2014, available at: 
http://www.edfenergy.com/about-us/shareholder- 
information/documents/Life_Extensions,_HPB_and_HNB_-_04.12.12.pdf ]. 
27 Nuclear Industry Association. 2013. Nuclear Industry Association – Industry Jobs Map. [Last 
accessed 29 March 2014, available at: 
http://issuu.com/nuclear_industry_association/docs/jobsmap_scot13 ]. 
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Source: Nuclear Industry Association, 2013.28 
 
 
 
4. The Scottish Government and Nuclear Energy 
 
Despite the current Scottish Government’s anti new nuclear build stance, nuclear 
energy is destined to play a role in its electricity sector until at least 2023 (see earlier 
comment on planned life-extensions). It is not clear what will happen then and if at a 
later date there will be a review of the stance of the Scottish Government on nuclear 
energy. The nuclear energy option in the future in Scotland is an issue for further 
examination and to-date it has received little attention. A brief look by the reasonably 
interested reader of available publications from the Scottish government, NGOs, and 
academic literature, point towards an area that is under-analysed and researched. 
Further, and equally significant, the contribution of nuclear energy to the overall 
energy policy debate seems misunderstood. 
 
This paper will next examine two recent (2013) communications by the Scottish 
Government in relation to nuclear energy. The first is a statement by the Scottish 
Energy Minister specifically on nuclear energy. The second analyses the references to 
nuclear energy in the Scottish Government independence document. 
 
On the 23 October 2013, the Scottish Energy Minister Mr. Fergus Ewing (Scottish 
Nationalist Party and Minister for Energy, Enterprise and Tourism) stated the 
following in response to the UK Government’s ambition in its announcement to 
support the development of a new nuclear plant: 
 
"Today's announcement confirms that consumers across the UK will be paying for nuclear 
generation until after the middle of this century. The single nuclear station at Hinkley could be 
eligible for consumer funded payments totalling around £1 billion per year, depending on 
wholesale prices. These payments will apply for the length of the contract being awarded – 
which, at 35 years, dwarfs the 15 years being offered to renewable energy technologies. 
The cost of this single station alone is comparable to the £43 billion which the UK 
Government’s budget is assigned for all energy technologies between 2013/14 and 2020/21 
and risks squeezing out home grown developments for imported nuclear technology. 
This UK Government's misguided enthusiasm for nuclear comes at a time when other 
countries, such as Germany and EDF’s home nation France, are either eliminating or scaling 
back their dependence on nuclear generation and when we should be putting the support to 
our renewables energy industry and the jobs it will support across the country. 
The guarantee of support and subsidy under this contract until after the middle of this century 
also sits in sharp contrast with the lack of a UK Government commitment to support our 
offshore renewables sector and its potential beyond 2020. 
The Scottish Government has an ambitious but achievable target to generate the equivalent of 
100% of electricity from renewable sources by 2020, alongside generation from thermal 
sources fitted with carbon capture and storage. 
Nuclear energy cannot be relied on for our energy needs. The output from Scottish nuclear 
generation fell to historic lows in 2006 and 2007 due to unplanned outages. Although output 
has increased since then, nuclear generation has not yet recovered to its pre 2006 levels. 
This underlines the susceptibility of nuclear to sudden interruptions, and supports the Scottish 
Government’s drive towards a balanced energy portfolio, based on cleaner thermal generation 
and the advantages which our huge renewables potential offers to Scotland." 
 
Statement by Mr. Fergus Ewing, MSP, Minister for Energy, Entreprise and Tourism. October 
23rd 2013.29 
 
 
28 Nuclear Industry Association. 2013. Ibid. 
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This statement has been chosen for analysis as it is one of the few communications 
verbal or written from the Scottish Government specifically on nuclear energy. The 
statement expresses a rather biased view against nuclear energy, at first in relation to 
the benefit of nuclear energy and second, in its discussion of the alternatives to 
nuclear energy. In addition, the statement demonstrates a disconnect between Scottish 
energy  policy  and  Scottish  economic  policy  of  moving  towards  a  low-carbon 
economy. 
 
A major oversight in the statement is that thermal generation power plants will have 
carbon capture and storage technology fitted to it. This is despite the withdrawal of 
funding to the Longannet project mentioned earlier. Back in 2011 £1 billion was 
promised to the carbon capture storage project by the UK government but this proved 
insufficient to ensure project success. 30  There were also parallel EU initiatives to 
support CCS but unfortunately the UK and EU competition criteria were poorly 
aligned. There is also the question of the commercial viability of carbon capture 
storage. Such commercial viability is not expected until 2030 at the earliest.31 Lowe et 
al. (2010) state that the lack of commercial viability for CCS relates to: the high cost 
of adding the CO2  capture plant; transport infrastructure and storage operations; the 
impact of CO2  capture on plant performance in output and efficiency; and the market 
structure of the electricity sector which does not cost CO2 emissions properly.32 Even 
so, CCS technology does not decrease carbon emissions to zero but only by a 
percentage and it uses energy from the fossil fuel plant itself to drive the process 
reducing overall  power  plant  (fuel  use) efficiency.  .  A  recent  2013  International 
Energy Agency report entitled Technology Roadmap: Carbon capture and storage 
confirms this finding as stated earlier. 
 
The statement shows a further misunderstanding of energy policy in that it cites both 
the change in France and Germany regarding nuclear energy as support for criticising 
the decision of the UK government. This demonstrates a lack of understanding energy 
policy holistically. The energy policy of Germany is a contradiction. The movement 
against nuclear energy is largely determined by internal political opinion, and not on 
more technical climate policy, or arguably even energy policy, considerations. 
Fundamentally German energy policy and the “Energiewende” may be characterised 
as a firm move away from nuclear power and in favour of renewables, smart grids and 
energy efficiency. Any low-carbon benefits are purported to emerge from this system 
transformation, but thus far they are not being seen. At this stage one sees a collapse 
of German wholesale power prices and an erosion of the market value of power 
companies while retail electricity prices are some of the highest in Europe because of 
a socialised  component  of the domestic consumer bill sitting atop the wholesale 
 
 
29 Ewing, F. 2013. Scotland’s response on nuclear energy. [Last accessed 08 January 2014, available at 
http://news.scotland.gov.uk/News/Scotland-s-response-on-nuclear-power-553.aspx ; and for a profile 
specific to Mr. Fergus Ewing see: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/People/14944/Scottish- 
Cabinet/fergusewing ]. 
30 BBC. 2011. Longannet carbon capture scheme scrapped. [Last accessed 08 January 2014, available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-north-east-orkney-shetland-15371258]. 
31 It is unclear when CCS will be commercially viable due in part due to the fact that it is not yet 
known which is the best technology for CCS. 
32 p. 97. Lowe, A., Beasley, B. and Berly, T. 2010. Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in Australia. In 
Hester, E. E. and Harrison, E. M. 2010. Carbon Capture: Sequestration and Storage. The Royal Society 
of Chemistry: Cambridge, UK. 
EPRG 1407 
11 
 
 
 
 
power  component.  Struggling  power  companies  note  the  collapse  of  the  EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme and the very low price on carbon emissions and hence 
direct investment to highly CO2 polluting lignite and hard coal based generation 
capacity. New coal fired power stations are being built in Germany and German 
power sector emissions are not yet falling33. In addition, early reports suggest that 
emissions of carbon dioxide have increased over the last few years.34  Is this what a 
low-carbon Scotland is aiming for? 
 
France, is not necessarily scaling down its nuclear energy ambitions. Despite the 
statement by President Hollande that the intention of energy policy in France is to 
reduce nuclear energy to 50 per cent, there are a variety of other factors at play. There 
was political motivation by the French President Francois Hollande to provide 
increased support for renewable energy and increase his political support from the 
Green Party. 35  Hollande’s government wants to reduce French reliance on nuclear 
energy  while  also  aiming  to  increase  significantly  renewable  energy  sources, 
remaining averse to domestic “fracking” and slowly removing its small reliance on 
fossil fuels. The French nuclear energy industry is also in transition, with a clear 
move to develop it globally rather than limit it to just France. The international 
nuclear energy industry is gathering pace, and EDF needs to use a significant amount 
of its resources abroad. There is also the advantage that licence renewals (life 
extensions) continue to be successful and France continues to be a net exporter of 
electricity. Nevertheless, France aims to keep half its electricity supply from nuclear 
energy and its actions do not represent comparison with a ‘no-nuclear policy’. 
 
For Scotland, the answer to the question of how to achieve a low-carbon economy 
should focus on reducing and replacing its reliance on fossil fuels – which account for 
47.8 per cent of its electricity mix (see Figure 1 earlier). The current focus on 
developing wind farms at a very large scale is not viable. Offshore wind farm 
development cannot be the sole solution as it is sometimes currently perceived., with 
recent cancellations of two projects in the UK. 36   The continued development of 
onshore wind farms is limited and Heffron (2013) refers to a wind energy tipping 
point where the public will demand no more onshore wind projects are built.37  This 
would imply that the replacement of operating nuclear power plants by wind turbines 
is not a realistic option; ca. 10,000 wind turbines would be needed to replace the 
 
 
 
 
 
33 The Economist, European utilities How to lose half a trillion euros, Oct 12th 2013. [Last accessed 
27 February 2014, available at: http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21587782-europes- 
electricity-providers-face-existential-threat-how-lose-half-trillion-euros ]. 
34 Physics Org. 2013. German greenhouse gas emissions rose in 2012. [Last accessed 08 January 2014, 
available at http://phys.org/news/2013-02-german-greenhouse-gas-emissions-rose.html ]. 
35 BBC 2014. France struggles to cut down on nuclear power. [Last accessed 29 March 2014, available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-25674581 ]. 
36 See recent media reports on two wind farm projects and one nuclear energy project: ‘Plans for 
£5.4bn Argyll Array offshore wind farm near Tiree dropped’ (BBC 13 December 2013), [Last accessed 
08  January  2014,  available  at  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-25364699; 
‘Wind energy faces adverse conditions as RWE axes project’ (Financial Times, 26 November  2013), 
[Last accessed 08 January 2014, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/08fc5494-5686-11e3-ab12- 
00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz2lmSbh6tF]. 
37 Heffron, R. J. 2013. Accommodating Energy Law within Environmental Law: An Irish Exploration. 
Irish Planning and Environmental Law, 20 (2), 56-64. 
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Energy Source Percentage in Support 
A. Support for Energy Generation projects in their area? 
Hydro 80% 
Large Scale Wind Projects 62% 
Solar 78% 
Nuclear Energy 32% 
Bioenergy 59% 
Shale Gas 24% 
Black Oil 37% 
Gas (excluding shale gas) 42% 
Coal 34% 
B. From what source should the majority of electricity come from? 
Hydro 27% 
Large Scale Wind Projects 18% 
Solar 15% 
Nuclear Energy 13% 
Bioenergy 3% 
Shale gas 1% 
Black Oil 0% 
Gas (excluding shale gas) 3% 
Coal 3% 
 
 
 
contribution of nuclear energy according to the data from Energy Research Systems 
Unit at the University of Strathclyde.38 
 
An examination of public preferences in Scotland in Table 3 below reveals that a 
significant proportion (32 per cent) of the public would be in favour of nuclear energy 
being built in their area. All energy projects built near the public are reasonable high 
suggesting that people see economic benefits to any such energy project. More 
significantly is the 13 per cent who would choose nuclear energy as the majority 
source for their electricity. This is quite high when in comparison to wind (at just 
18%) and the total combined of fossil fuels (including shale gas) which is just 7 in per 
cent in total. This suggests a clear preference for low-carbon energy sources by the 
Scottish public - with 86 per cent favouring the majority of their electricity supply 
from lo-carbon energy sources. 
 
Table 3: Public Preferences in Scotland in the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: YouGov, February 2013.39 
 
The  final  paragraphs  of  the  statement  by Mr.  Fergus  Ewing,  MSP,  Minister  for 
Energy, Entreprise and Tourism, reveals a policy bias against nuclear energy. Nuclear 
energy is apparently unreliable, there can be sudden interruptions and that Scottish 
energy  policy  should  consist  of  a  “balanced  energy  portfolio,  based  on  cleaner 
thermal generation and the advantages which our huge renewables potential offers to 
Scotland." Nuclear energy’s reported poor reliability stems from low levels of 
generation  arising  from  minor  outages  at  both  plants  in  2005  and  2006.  The 
 
 
 
38 Energy Systems Research Unit. 2013. University of Strathclyde, Scotland UK. [Last accessed 08 
January 2014, available at http://www.esru.strath.ac.uk/EandE/Web_sites/01- 
02/RE_info/interesting.htm]. 
39 YouGov, 2013. Scottish Renewable Surevey Results, February 25th - 26th Results. [Last accessed 29 
March 2014, available at 
http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/vj66wakgzm/YG-Scottish- 
Renewables-Archive-results-260213-renewable-energy.pdf ]. 
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Minister’s statement fails to mention the contribution of nuclear energy to base-load 
electricity provision and intermittency of renewable energy. 
 
In addition, there is the repeated assertion at the end of the statement that Scotland 
will benefit from cleaner thermal energy production. As stated earlier, it is highly 
suspect to base an energy policy on this as stated earlier because of the lack of CCS 
technology development. It emerges from this final part of the statement that Scotland 
plans to move towards a low-carbon economy with a continued ambition to use 
thermal/fossil fuel power plants; this is repeated in the White Paper on Scottish 
Independence. 
 
The fossil fuel industry plays a significant role in the Scottish economy. Indeed, there 
can be no doubt that they play an influential role in the political lobbying of various 
kinds in Scotland and down in Westminister. A recent study in the US, demonstrated 
the scale of the fossil fuel lobby groups and calculated that they spend close to $900 
million per year.40 It would be naïve to think that similar sums (in proportion to size 
of the industry and population) were not spent in the UK; indeed, recently, Hutton 
(2014) expressed an opinion that lobbyists remain a problem in the UK.41 
 
 
 
5. Nuclear Energy in an Independent Scotland 
 
An examination of material from the Scottish Government demonstrates similar 
contradictions. 42     The  document  entitled  Scotland’s  Future:  Your  Guide  to  an 
Independent Scotland (hereafter referred to as the White Paper on Scottish 
Independence) published in November 2013 makes for interesting reading regarding 
nuclear energy and its overall contribution to energy policy. 
 
It  is  a  stated  aim  within  the  White  Paper  on  Scottish  Independence  that  an 
independent Scotland aims to decarbonise its electricity supply (p. 18). It is not clear 
however, despite the rhetoric in the document how Scotland aims to achieve this. The 
document highlights that one of three central aims is for Scotland to be a leader on 
climate change (p. 293) and that there will be an accelerated delivery of its 
commitments on reducing CO2  emissions (p. 292). Yet however, moving to discuss 
energy specifically, the White Paper on Scottish Independence repeats that the 
decarbonisation of the electricity sector is a priority and the continuation of its non- 
new nuclear stance (p. 299). The document states that renewable energy and its 
development are a safer and more cost-effective method of achieving this than 
investing in nuclear energy. The reader is not told however, what will happen the 47.8 
per cent of electricity supply from fossil fuels. The implication is that an expansion of 
renewable energy and energy efficiency gains will render nuclear energy unnecessary. 
 
 
 
 
40 Brulle, R. J. 2013. Institutionalizing Delay: foundation funding and the creation of US climate 
change counter-movement organisations. Climatic Change, (Advance Access) DOI 10.1007/s10584- 
013-1018-7. 
41 Hutton, W. 2014. Power Lobbyists and Fawning Ministers are Corroding Society. The Observer, 11 
January 2014. [Last accessed 12 January 2014, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/11/corrosive-influence-big-business-lobbyists]. 
42  Scottish Government. (2013). Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to  an Independent Scotland. The 
Scottish Government: St. Andrew’s House, Edinburgh, UK. 
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The discussion on oil and gas (p. 301 onwards) makes for more revealing reading. 
The oil and gas reserves of Scotland will continue to be developed. Further, an 
independent Scotland would support further exploration and as a result will continue 
with policies to support this. These policies include having tax-relief schemes and 
other incentives for oil and gas exploration (p. 303-305). The oil and gas industry it 
highlights face large up-front costs, and methods for lowering these and other costs 
such as decommissioning will be sought by the new Scottish administration. 
 
The document specifies clear support for the export-oriented fossil fuel industry while 
in contrast criticises the UK government for supporting low-carbon nuclear energy. 
The global climate impacts of Scottish carbon making its way to the atmosphere are 
rather over-looked and assisted by the fact that international climate policy focuses on 
the geographical location of fossil fuel combustion not resource extraction. The White 
Paper on Scottish Independence holds nuclear energy as too expensive, in need of 
long-term contracts and being unsafe. These three latter issues will be examined in 
turn.  The  development  of  new  nuclear  energy  is  expensive  mainly  due  to  large 
upfront costs. It does not benefit from tax relief schemes which apply to the oil and 
gas  sector.  A  brief  examination  of  the  tax  reliefs  that  oil  and  gas  production 
companies receive is revealing. Tax reliefs are given for nearly every expense related 
to production, and exploration, for both planned, successful and unsuccessful projects. 
An overview is outlined in a document from the HM Revenue and Customs titled A 
Guide to  UK  and  UK  Continental  Shelf  Life: Oil  and  Gas  Taxation  2008. 43   In 
addition, UK taxpayers will also pay for decommissioning in the oil and gas sector 
which will now receive tax incentives on decommissioning costs, estimated at £30 
billion over the next 15 years; this tax relief was granted in 2012.44  The offering of 
tax relief for development and decommission represent similar long-term contracts to 
those being given to nuclear energy in the UK. Part of the purpose of tax legislation 
for fossil fuels is stated as to “allow a project to rapidly recover its costs”.45 Why are 
low-carbon energy sources not treated the same way and allowed to recover costs of a 
project rapidly? Fundamentally energy policy and oil and gas extraction policies 
occupy  different  worlds  –  and  there  is  little  joined  up  decision  making.  An 
independent Scotland is likely to do nothing to alter that reality as there are political 
benefits in preserving it. 
 
Finally, in terms of safety, it is not specified in the White Paper on Scottish 
Independence why nuclear energy is unsafe. Safety is a key concern across the energy 
sector, and low safety standards in the energy sector are a subsidy as it reduces the 
cost of providing safe operations. If safety is seen in terms of fatalities a recent study 
has showed that between 1971 and 2009 the use of nuclear power in comparison to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 UK HM Revenue and Customs. 2008. A Guide to UK and UK Continental Shelf Life: Oil and Gas 
Taxation 2008. [Last Accessed November 30th, available from: 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/international/ns-fiscal3.htm]. 
44 Burges Salmon. 2013. Guaranteeing Tax Relief for Decommissioning. Oil and Gas Connect. Issue 9, 
August     2013.     [Last     Accessed     November     30th,     available     from:     http://www.burges- 
salmon.com/Sectors/energy_and_utilities/Oil%20and%20Gas/Publications/Guaranteeing_tax_relief_fo 
r_decommissioning_what_will_it_mean.pdf ]. 
45  UK HM Revenue and Customs. 2013. Guide to the North Sea Fiscal Regime. [Last Accessed 
November 30th, available from: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/oilandgas/guide/prt.htm]. 
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fossil fuels has saved 1.8 million lives.46  Fossil fuels in general have high fatality 
rates for example in the US and China where there are ca. 30 and 2000 fatalities per 
annum respectively.47  The UK has suffered its own major accidents with Piper Alfa 
causing 167 deaths in 1985. The question arises, has the safety culture improved, or 
do lower safety standards contribute to the lower cost of fossil fuels? 
 
Douglas (2002: xix) makes an interesting connection in this regard, and links big 
industry and government together, alongside the influence of political affiliation – in 
many ways the fossil fuel issue and not nuclear energy in Scotland mirrors this quote: 
 
“Dangers are manifold and omnipresent. Action would be paralysed if individuals attended to 
them all; anxiety has to be selective. We drew on the idea that risk is like a taboo. Arguments 
about risk are highly charged, morally and politically. Naming a risk amounts to an accusation. 
The selection of which dangers are terrifying and which can be ignored depends on what kind of 
behavior the risk-accusers want to stop. Not risky sports, not sunbathing nor crossing the road; it 
was to do with nuclear or chemical hazards – in short, big industry and government. Subsequent 
survey research showed that political affiliation was the best indicator of the distribution of 
attitudes to risk.” 
Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo.48 
Professor Mary Douglas, xix preface to the Routledge Classics 2002 edition. 
 
 
 
6. Nuclear Waste in an Independent Scotland 
 
This issue of nuclear waste is a problem in many countries worldwide. Perhaps the most 
forward-thinking countries on this issue are Sweden and Finland. Both these countries 
have had long-term nuclear waste storage plans and both are in the process of receiving 
final approval to begin construction.49 
 
Scotland currently has two nuclear power stations with two reactors on each site. An 
independent Scotland might be expected to have to deal with the problem of Scottish 
nuclear waste, and perhaps also the nuclear wastes arising from its plants that are 
currently being stored at Sellafield in England. The problem arises because under EU 
law it is the responsibility of member states to manage spent fuel and radioactive waste. 
However, it is possible that two or more member states can agree to use a common 
disposal facility under strict conditions.50 So Scotland could avail of the latter upon 
becoming an EU member State, assuming the residual UK were to agree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 Pushker A. Kharecha and James E. Hansen, ‘Prevented Mortality and Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Historical and Projected Nuclear Power’ (2013) 47 (9) Environmental Science Technology, 4489- 
4895. 
47 This is an average taken from across multiple sources from the US Labour Department to OECD 
statistics and is a conservative estimate. For a full list of sources please contact the author. 
48 Douglas, M. 2002. Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (Routledge 
Classics Edition). Routledge: London, UK. 
49 For more on this see: Heffron, R. J. 2013. Nuclear Energy, Year in Review. In Fauchald, O. D., 
Hunter, D. and Wang, X. 2012. Yearbook of International Environmental Law, Vol. 23, 269-273. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK. 
50 Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom OJ L199/48. Establishing a Community Framework for the 
Responsible and Safe Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste. For a brief summary see: last 
accessed 27 February 2014  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-906_en.htm. 
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In addition, EU law51 now obliges member states to develop national programmes for 
nuclear waste disposal and to notify them to the European Commission by 2015 at the 
latest. These national programmes must include a timetable for the construction of 
disposal facilities, as well as a description of the activities needed to implement disposal 
solutions, costs assessments and a description of the financing schemes.52 
 
There is conflict here in that Scotland has rejected the idea of a deep geological disposal 
facility (“GDF”)53 (and also new nuclear build).54 Heffron et al. (2013)55 comment that: 
 
“Jamie Reed MP (Labour) voiced concerns in parliament in 2012 as to whether 
the government will commit itself to an analysis of the volumes of Scottish higher 
activity radioactive waste which is stored in England, the costs to remove them, 
where they will be located in Scotland, and who will be responsible for them in 
the  long  term. 56     A  Scottish  government  statement  in  reply  suggested  that 
proposals for nuclear decommissioning in an independent Scotland would be 
covered in a white paper to be published in November 2013.”57 
 
However, the storage of nuclear waste and nuclear decommissioning has received little 
attention in the White Paper on Scottish Independence. It is addressed very briefly (p. 
520-521) and no solutions are given, just an expression that nuclear waste will be 
managed safely and effectively. The promised answers have not yet (April 2014) 
materialised. 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion: The Nuclear Future in Scotland 
 
Whether one is for, against, or indifferent to new nuclear energy development, the 
topic highlights a major gap in Scotland’s energy and environmental policy goals. The 
energy policy debate from the Scottish Government perspective has been reduced to a 
low-carbon  energy  development  debate  between  nuclear  energy  and  renewable 
energy. The challenge should be how to reduce the 47.8 per cent of the electricity 
supply sector that comes from fossil fuels, noting Scotland’s continuing enthusiasm 
for fossil fuel extraction and processing. 
 
This continuation of the use of fossil fuels will continue the emission of carbon 
dioxide. This prompts the question, were an independent Scotland to join the EU, 
would their accession agreement require them to close their fossil fuel power plants? 
 
51 Fn 34, Ibid. 
52 Fn 34, Ibid, Chapter 2 Obligations, Article 5 National Framework (a) – (h). 
53 Scottish Government, 2011. Scotland’s Higher Activity Radioactive Waste Policy. DPPAS11098 
(01/11), 4-5. 
54 Scottish Government. 2008. Scottish Energy Policy: An Overview (p.7) [Last accessed 08 January 
2014, available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/237670/0065265.pdf]. 
55 Heffron, R. J., Allen, M. and McCauley, D. 2013. The Forgotten Law and Policy Issue: Nuclear 
Waste Management in Scotland. Edinburgh Law Review, 17 (3), 325-332. 
56 Scottish Express. 20012. Nuclear waste Bill threat to Scotland, 22 January 2012. [Last accessed 08 
January  2014,  available  at   http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/297168/Nuclear-waste-bill-threat-to- 
Scotland ]. 
57 News & Star. 2012. Cumbrian MP says Scotland must take waste back under independence, 18 
October         2012         [Last         accessed         08         January         2014,         available         at 
http://www.newsandstar.co.uk/news/business/cumbrian-mp-says-scotland-must-take-waste-back- 
under-independence-1.1005981?referrerPath=home]. 
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For many new EU Member States since 2005, the closure of fossil fuel plants has 
been a key part of meeting their accession agreements.58  In addition, the European 
Industrial Emissions Directive (Directive 2010/75/EU - to have been implemented by 
2013) places limits on the emissions of and fossil fuel power plants (in particular, SO2 
and NOx ) 
 
For Scotland to aspire to being a low-carbon economy, to decarbonising its electricity 
market, and to being a leader within the climate change community, it needs to tackle 
the issue of how to stop the continuation of burning fossil fuels. This is not something 
the Scottish Government has yet achieved. Until this happens these policy aspirations 
of the Scottish Government must be seen as consisting of simultaneous enthusiasm 
for a renewables-led energy policy and an oil and gas extraction industrial policy. 
Between these two odd components sits nuclear energy – an important Scottish 
industry  destined  for  neglect  and  decline  almost  irrespective  of  Scottish 
independence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 New entrants to the EU had to reduce state aid to the fossil fuel sector and also reduce emissions 
such as those from fossil fuel plants, for example: SO2, Nox, VOC and NH3 . For more detail please 
see the EU Accession Articles on Energy and the Environment respectively: [Last accessed 18 April 
2014, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement_new/treaty/default_en.htm ]. 
